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THE LEGAL CULTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS 
KERMIT L. HALL 
The great prairie lawyer Abraham Lincoln once 
said of an opposing legal counsel's argument, 
"He caught on to something, but only by the 
hind leg."l Lincoln's observation applies with 
equal force to our current understanding of the 
legal culture of the Great Plains, and even that 
characterization is generous. Take, for example, 
the literature on the region's history of public 
and private law and legal institutions. It is piti-
fully small. Bits and pieces are scattered through 
specialized journals and state history periodi-
cals, but there is nothing like a systematic body 
of scholarship. 2 
The major bibliographic guide to the liter-
ature in American constitutional and legal his-
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tory lists, during the past twenty years, only six 
articles dealing with the subject and no books. 
These numbers stand in sharp contrast to the 
more than sixty entries and two major books 
on southern legal history and the more than 
twenty articles devoted to the legal culture of 
the Rocky Mountain and Pacific states. 3 Our 
ignorance about the legal culture of the Great 
Plains is even more sobering when we realize 
that in the past century scholars of American 
constitutional and legal history have produced 
more than twenty thousand books and articles, 
with more than four thousand of those pub-
lished in the 1980s. While the Great Plains 
economies have regularly gone through cycles 
of boom and bust, scholarship about the region's 
legal culture has never even taken off. Indeed, 
there is not even an agenda for such scholar-
ship. 
So an important threshold question is why 
this neglect? In part, it is an accident of loca-
tion. The major centers of learning about legal 
history have not been in the plains states; there 
has been no Willard Hurst or Lawrence Fried-
man to make the region a historical laboratory 
for testing various hypotheses about legal cul-
ture. Instead the nation's legal history has been 
drawn, at least until quite recently, from the 
East and from New England, especially. If Wil-
lard Hurst, perhaps the greatest American legal 
historian, had lived in Nebraska instead of Wis-
consin, chances are good that we would know 
more today about its legal culture than we do. 
Even native Nebraskan Roscoe Pound, who had 
strong historical interests, drew his examples 
from England and New England rather than the 
Plains. t 
Second, while scholars have churned out an 
impressive body of literature about the Great 
Plains, they have seldom thought to analyze law 
and legal institutions as reflections of the re-
gion's assumptions about society, culture, and 
economy. When they have turned to the law, 
historians of the Great Plains have usually taken 
climate and geography as both the beginning 
and the ending point of analysis, failing to probe 
the ways in which modes of economic produc-
tion and social organization on the Plains have 
shaped and been shaped by the law. Historians 
of the Great Plains have not approached law as 
a social and cultural artifact; instead, they have 
typically viewed it as a closed system chained 
by environmental determinism. 5 
There is a third reason for the slight atten-
tion paid to the region's legal history. For the 
national community of jurists, the Great Plains 
has been a legal backwater. Judges and treatise 
writers in the nation's other regions have paid 
slight attention to legal developments on the 
Plains. Studies by Peter Harris, Lawrence Fried-
man, and Rodney Mott on the reputations of 
state supreme courts over the past century and 
a halfleave little doubt about this matter. 6 Peter 
Harris measured citations by sixteen state su-
preme courts of cases from other state supreme 
courts forthe period 1870-1970. The two Great 
Plains states included in his study-Kansas and 
South Dakota-have persistently lacked cita-
tion power. Indeed, the states of the Great Plains 
ranked even lower than the often maligned state 
courts of the South, including Alabama, North 
Carolina, and Virginia. In Harris's study, no-
body cited two state supreme courts as author-
ity-Delaware and South Dakota. 7 Of course, 
citation is not the same as influence, and there 
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is reason to believe, according to the studies of 
Rodney Mott, that the high courts of Kansas 
and Nebraska in the early twentieth century 
achieved some distinction. But no appellate 
court on the Great Plains has ever achieved the 
reputation enjoyed by its counterparts in Cal-
ifornia, New York, and Massachusetts. 8 
This status reflects the fact that the states 
with the richest and most complex economic, 
social, and cultural settings are also likely to 
produce the richest legal environment. 9 But it 
is also true that the Great Plains states have 
been net importers of legal talent. A collective 
survey of the 420 judges who served on the 
highest courts of appeal in the ten states be-
tween 1870 and 1970 reveals as much. \0 Until 
the mid-1930s a majority of plains state judges 
received their legal educations outside the re-
gion, a condition that suggests that legal edu-
cation there lagged behind developments 
elsewhere. Only in the last fifty years have the 
Great Plains states developed a high proportion 
of judges trained within the region. 
There is a fourth and final reason why legal 
historians have showered so little attention on 
the Great Plains. Lincoln, once again, captured 
the spirit of things. In describing an especially 
spirited wrestling match, he observed that the 
opponents had struggled so fiercely that they 
got inside one another's coats. More often than 
not, legal historians have simply swallowed up 
the Great Plains as part of the general legal 
history of the West. 11 
That the legal culture of the Great Plains 
has been ignored does not mean, of course, that 
it should be ignored or that it is unimportant. 
We should also recognize that our lack of at-
tention to law and legal institutions on the Great 
Plains only abets the skewed vision that we have 
of American legal development as an emana-
tion exclusively of New England. 12 
Having said all of this, we arrive at the cen-
tral question. Has the Great Plains had and does 
it now have a distinctive legal culture? By legal 
culture we mean the ideas, attitudes, values, 
and opinions about law held by people in a 
society. 13 The assumption is that these ideas and 
attitudes influence legal behavior, especially the 
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kind and level of demands placed on the legal 
system. In raising the question of legal culture, 
we are asking when and why and where people 
have turned to law and government. The as-
sumption is that if we understand legal culture 
we can, in tum, better appreciate the role of 
law in society. 
We can grasp the implications of this rela-
tionship between social change and the law by 
resorting to a somewhat stereotypical perspec-
tive. As one sage has observed: 
In Germany, under the law, everything is 
prohibited except that which is permitted. 
In France, under the law, everything is 
permitted, except that which is prohibited. 
In the Soviet Union, under the law, 
everything is prohibited, including that which 
is permitted. 
In Italy, under the law, everything is per-
mitted, especially that which is prohibited. 
And in the United States, under the law, 
everything is both permitted and prohibited, 
because Americans are forever deciding the 
law but nothing ever seems to get decided. 14 
We should remember, however, that partic-
ularity is not the same thing as legal culture. 
The Great Plains, like all regions of the nation, 
has certainly generated unique demands that 
have, in tum, produced laws and legal insti-
tutions different from those of other areas of the 
country. How different these changes really have 
been, both as a matter of inter- and intrare-
gional comparison, is something worth paying 
attention to, but we should remember that 
uniqueness and adaptation of older legal forms 
to newer circumstances does not necessarily 
herald a new legal culture. It is the attitudes, 
values, ideas, and opinions behind those changes 
that really count, and they can, of course, be 
exactly the same even if they are expressed in 
different ways. The other important point is 
that legal culture is not static; it evolves over 
time as the nature of social demands and ex-
pectations change. As Roscoe Pound once ob-
served: "The law must be stable, but it must 
not stand still. "15 
REGIONALISM AND LAW 
Our interest in the legal culture of the Great 
Plains is further evidence of the renewed vigor 
of regional history generally, especially in legal 
history. 16 After more than forty years of neglect, 
regional studies of all stripes are once again on 
the rise, in part because they appear to offer 
certain comparative advantages not found in 
local, state, or national studies. Legal historians 
have in fact shown increasing sympathy toward 
regional studies over the past decade. David 
Bodenhamer, Gordon Bakken, James W. Ely, 
Jr., Paul Finkelman, John Reid, and David Lan-
gum, to name but a few, have argued that gen-
eralizations drawn from regional patterns of legal 
organization and behavior are of greater com-
parative significance than generalizations drawn 
from community or national studies alone. 17 Re-
gional studies, they contend, have allowed 
scholars to identify more precisely that which 
is merely local and to control for its effects. 
Similarly, proponents of regional studies insist 
that their findings offer the best test of attitudes 
and behavior that purport to be truly national. 
In order to have a regional legal history, 
however, one must first have a region. In the 
case of the Great Plains, the matter of definition 
is a good deal more complex than might first 
appear. The simplest and most commonly used 
definition is environmental. Its leading pro-
ponent was Walter Prescott Webb, who be-
lieved that physical geography and climate 
unified the region. Webb's book, The Great 
Plains, first published in 1931, remains today 
the single most widely read history of the re-
gion. In it he approached the Great Plains as 
an environment unified by its flatness, lack of 
trees, and semiaridity. For our purposes, this 
plains environment can be narrowed to what 
constitutes the heart of the region-portions of 
the ten states of Montana, Wyoming, Colo-
rado, New Mexico, North and South Dakota, 
Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. Webb 
argued that once immigrants crossed the eastern 
boundary of the Great Plains at the ninety-
eighth meridian all of the institutions they had 
known in the East were, in his words, "either 
broken or remade or else greatly altered. "18 
This environment, Webb insisted, produced 
not only a unique body of law but a legal culture 
entirely distinct from that in the East. "The 
Easterner, with his background of forest and 
farm," Webb observed, "could not always un-
derstand the man of the cattle kingdom." 
One went on foot, the other went on horse-
back; one carried his law in books, the other 
carried it strapped round his waist. One rep-
resented tradition, the other represented in-
novation; one responded to convention, the 
other responded to necessity and evolved his 
own conventions. Yet the man of the timber 
and the town made the law for the man of 
the plain;' the plainsman, finding this law 
unsuited to his needs, broke it and was called 
lawless. 19 
Webb also pointed to the democratic nature of 
the Great Plains, giving special attention to the 
development of women's suffrage. In short, ac-
cording to Webb, the legal culture of the Great 
Plains resonated to the values of innovation, 
individualism, democracy, and lawlessness pres-
ent in the region's general culture. The great 
open skies of the Plains, it seems, provided al-
most boundless opportunities for individuals, so 
much so that individuals often took the law into 
their own hands. 
Historians, geographers, and anthropologists 
have subjected Webb's environmental deter-
minism to often withering criticism, but it re-
tains considerable vitality, as any reader of Ian 
Frazier's similarly titled recent book on the re-
gion will appreciate. 2o Moreover, of all the his-
torians who have written on the Great Plains, 
Webb provides by far the most coherent, if ul-
timately clipped, assessment of the law and legal 
institutions. Thus, both as a way of assessing 
the region's legal culture and as a means of 
dealing with the coherence of the Great Plains 
as other than a geographic fact of life, Webb's 
thesis of individualism, innovation, and vio-
lence seems an appropriate place for the infant 
field of Great Plains legal history to begin. 
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TESTING WEBB'S THESIS 
Much of Webb's argument about the inven-
tiveness and individualism of the Great Plains 
rested on his analysis of property law in three 
important areas: land, livestock, and water. But 
how well do his arguments hold up? 
Take, for example, the open-range cattle in-
dustry in the Great Plains. The fact that fencing 
materials were scarce in the treeless plain led 
cattlemen to demand that the English common-
law requirement to fence livestock be abrogated 
and the burden of fencing be placed upon crop 
farmers. Plains legislators passed open-range 
statutes that placed the burden to fence on the 
farmer. If damage to crops by livestock were 
litigated, then the farmer had to prove he had 
maintained a legal fence around his crops to 
collect money damages from the cattle owner. 
Yet there was considerable borrowing; fencing-
out statutes were hardly unique to the Plains. 
Borrowing legal doctrine from the East was one 
of the common features of the Great Plains, 
and even in an area so seemingly unique as the 
cattle industry, cultural memories about law were 
often long. John Reid has made the same point 
about migrants crossing the Great Plains in the 
1850s. 21 
What gave visibility to the fencing statutes 
on the Great Plains was not their novelty but 
the fact that they sought to resolve conflicts 
among farmers, free-grass cattlemen, and barbed-
wire ranchers. Hence the legal culture of the 
Great Plains resonated far more to the economic 
pressures associated with a shift on the Plains 
from the nineteenth-century economics of pas-
toral stock raising to the twentieth century prac-
tice of farming. In short, the law as it affected 
cattle and fencing had more to do with com-
peting modes of economic production than it 
did with innovation as a paramount value. 22 
There seems little doubt that the law of prop-
erty rights in the West was highly instrumental 
where issues of economic development were in-
volved. Initially land on the Great Plains was 
not a scarce resource although it eventually be-
came so. For much of the 1860s and 1870s 
"squatter sovereignty" was sufficient for settling 
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land ownership questions. 23 The range was open 
and there was little in the way of an exclusive 
right to own and use it. Cattlemen did not own 
the land; they exercised instead "range rights" 
that neighbors recognized but that the law did 
not enforce. To secure these accustomed rights, 
ranchers ran claim advertisements in local 
newspapers. By the 1880s, however, competing 
agricultural groups on the Plains often had con-
flicting claims to the same land without any 
enforceable mechanism to settle them. The re-
sult was a prolonged struggle among different 
kinds of land users. Cattlemen, for example, 
organized in an effort to persuade state and ter-
ritoriallegislators to pass statutes that punished 
those who drove their stock from the accus-
tomed range, but by the 1880s stock growers 
associations had persuaded several state legis-
latures to enact statutes that restricted entry 
onto the range through control of access to the 
limited water supplies. The entire movement 
in land law in the Great Plains at the end of 
the nineteenth century was from communal to 
exclusive ownership, a development that had 
long been under way in the East and that has 
continued unabated even today as more and 
more of Great Plains land and productive ca-
pacity has been placed in fewer and fewer 
hands.24 While often advertised as protecting 
individual property rights, these developments 
have actually produced a consolidation of land-
holding that mocks the notion of the small, 
self-reliant farmer. Once again, the generally 
inefficient small livestock and farming enter-
prises yielded before large, well capitalized ag-
ricultural businesses. 
Much the same has happened with water law, 
an area to which Webb pointed to underscore 
the inventiveness of Great Plains legal culture. 
As with land and livestock, however, water reg-
ulation on the Plains seems less innovative and 
distinctive than Webb imagined. 25 From the 
outset, access to and control of water was the 
most crucial economic consideration on the 
Plains. Initially western settlers adopted the ri-
parian system of water rights, which meant that 
the right to use water accrued to the one who 
owned the bank of the stream. That such ri-
parian water rights, whether implicit or ex-
plicit, were adopted by the frontiersman is not 
difficult to understand. Indeed, it was not until 
settlement was well under way, as Donald J. 
Pisani has shown, that water law began to change 
significantly, granting to the first appropriator 
of it an exclusive right and to later appropriators 
rights conditioned upon the prior rights of those 
who had gone before them. 26 The new rules 
also permitted the diversion of waters to non-
riparian lands, the extinguishment of rights in 
water if not used, and the transfer of water rights 
from one person to another. 
As with land and livestock, the pattern in 
the development of water law on the Great 
Plains was from common to exclusive rights. 
Yet even in this seemingly most unique area, 
the states of the Great Plains were borrowers, 
as Robert G. Dunbar has shown. The states did 
not build their own system of water law de novo; 
instead they borrowed lavishly from the Cali-
fornia legislature and supreme court, whose de-
cisions in Irwin v. PhiUips, Lux v. Haggin, and 
Katz v. Walkinshaw became models adopted in 
the plains states. 27 Colorado, for example, which 
led the states of the Great Plains in dealing with 
the issues of multiple uses of water, drew heavily 
from the California experience to fashion what 
became known as the Colorado Doctrine---a 
doctrine that protected vested users in their 
rights to water. 28 
Moreover, there were significant differences 
within the Great Plains. Much like Lincoln's 
wrestlers, Webb often let the status of water law 
in the Great Plains get swallowed up in his 
description of the West as a whole. The trend 
toward exclusivity was strongest in those states---
Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, and New Mex-
ic(}-where rainfall averaged less than fifteen 
inches a year, while in states with somewhat 
greater amounts of rainfall-North and South 
Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and 
Texas--the common law was retained in a mod-
ified form, one that followed the lead of Cali-
fornia in recognizing both riparian and 
appropriative rights. Furthermore, the long term 
pattern has not been to serve the individual 
small water user but to reward the heavily cap-
italized businesses that make modem agribusi-
ness work. 
There is no doubt that innovation was an 
important feature of the Great Plains legal cul-
ture, but it was neither unique nor determi-
native. Property rights were sometimes treated 
in different ways than they were in the East, 
but that did not mean that easterners, in other 
areas of economic development, such as the 
fellow servant rule, assumption of risk, and con-
tributory negligence, were incapable of inno-
vating on their own. The reasonable use 
doctrine, which became an important part of 
water law on the Great Plains, was also applied 
to stream courses and water power in the East 
as a way of expediting the development of man-
ufacturing. 29 In the end, felt economic needs, 
not geography and climate, were the real in-
ducements to legal innovation-in the Great 
Plains or elsewhere. 
LAWLESSNESS AND VIOLENCE 
Interregional differences in legal culture and 
the habit of borrowing were evident in two other 
areas: lawlessness and violence and the legaV 
political status of women. The Great Plains, 
according to commentators as different in out-
look as Webb and Patricia Nelson Limerick, was 
a rough and tumble place, in which violence 
and extralegal behavior figured prominently in 
the underlying culture. Truman Capote, of 
course, crystallized the notion of the violent 
Plains in his book In Cold Blood. Capote cap-
tured the essence of what frightens us most about 
violence on the Plains--it was random, re-
morseless, methodical, and suffered in a remote 
Kansas farm house. There were, of course, other 
kinds of violence on the Plains; some of it, like 
that associated with Bat Masterson and Wyatt 
Earp, involved conflict resolution, while other 
violence, such as that associated with ecotage 
and the Earth First! movement, was directed at 
authority itself. 30 
Let us, however, concentrate only on one 
kind of crime--homicide. One of the reasons 
that Capote's book so shocks our conscience is 
that it is the exception and not the rule. Every 
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recent study of violence and crime finds the 
Great Plains states lagging far behind the na-
tional leader-the South. The white male 
homicide rates from the late nineteenth century 
up to today reveal that no Great Plains state, 
including that seeming bastion of violence--
Texas---, ranks in the top twenty, with most of 
the states of the Plains scattered over the middle 
or lower end of the spectrum. 31 In more recent 
times, Texas and New Mexico have shown a 
higher rate of homicide, but even they lag be-
hind Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, 
South Carolina, and Florida. The other Great 
Plains states rank very low. 32 
These figures also caution us against thinking 
about the Great Plains in an exclusively North-
South fashion. Cultural interpreters of the 
Plains, such as Earl Pomeroy and Robert Berk-
hofer, have argued that in many instances such 
an alignment does not make sense. 33 Homicide 
rates suggest as much. The culture of North 
Dakota, for example, more closely resembles 
that of Minnesota than that of Nebraska and 
Kansas. The southern Plains, on the other hand, 
have much more in common with Arkansas and 
Tennessee than with the northern Plains. Ac-
cording to many geographers, folklorists, and 
linguists, it is the East-West patterns of settle-
ment and interregional migration flows rather 
than environmental attributes that define the 
Plains.J.4 
In the case of homicide and suicide that was 
certainly true. Where the influx of southern 
immigrants was greatest-Texas, New Mexico, 
and Oklahoma-the incidence of violence was 
the highest. Where the flow of population in-
cluded more Scandinavian and Yankee stock, 
as was true in the northern tier of the Great 
Plains states, homicide has been less frequent. 
In short, as Raymond D. Gastil's study of cul-
tural regionalism reveals, the presence of south-
erners on the Great Plains has historically been 
the best predictor of violence. At the same time, 
the incidence of suicide has been highest in the 
northern Plains, with its strong Scandinavian 
origins. 35 Any characterization of the Great 
Plains as violent always has to be framed com-
paratively, since there are fairly significant in-
ter- and intraregional variations. 
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LEGAL AND POLITICAL STATUS 
OF WOMEN 
The same can be said of the legal and po-
litical status of women. We are only beginning 
to have some idea of the historical development 
of family law on the Plains. There is a working 
hypothesis that marital matters in farming com-
munities tend to be conservative, with little 
room for women to escape. Yet if we look be-
neath this relationship, as Paula Petrik is doing 
in her on-going study of divorce law in the 
West, we find a mixture of morality and eco-
nomic expediency. Here as elsewhere, Great 
Plains lawmakers seemed sensitive to economic 
necessity, crafting the law in instrumental ways 
so as to protect the integrity and earning power 
of the family. Take, for example, the case of 
Nebraska. Its divorce law included grounds of 
desertion, adultery, extreme cruelty, intemper-
ance, and an omnibus provision of other but 
less utilized causes, including impotency, con-
viction for a felony, and the like. In this regard 
Nebraska divorce law mimicked developments 
elsewhere in the country. But in those plains 
states with large numbers of homesteaders, Pe-
trik has also discovered that a "dower" clause 
was attached to most divorce statutes. It enti-
tled a wronged wife to her dower right (one-
third of the property) should her spouse be 
blamed for the dissolution of the marriage. 36 
The dower clause, in short, complicated divorce 
in late nineteenth-century Nebraska and dem-
onstrated the influence of homestead-based land 
ownership on divorce in the upper Great Plains. 
The dower clause probably helped to account 
for the higher number of settlement and ali-
mony cases that came to the highest appellate 
courts of the northern Plains, which were faced 
with the task of constantly refining the bound-
aries of spousal support. 
The dower clause also apparently influenced 
husbands. We know, for example, that more 
men than women filed for divorce in Nebraska, 
employing a preemptive strike strategy to shift 
blame to their wives and protect their farms 
from execution. There is also evidence, ac-
cording to Petrik, that the highest appellate 
courts of the northern tier of the Great Plains 
states were increasingly pressed to give clearer 
and clearer definitions of extreme cruelty and 
desertion-normally "women's" charges in a di-
vorce proceeding. The Montana Supreme Olurt 
in Albert tI. Albert in 1885 defined extreme cru-
elty as a single incident of physical abuse and 
set the stage for the lower courts' use of mental 
cruelty. The Wyoming legislature in 1899, how-
ever, threw in the towel and simply provided 
that divorces could be granted as a result of any 
"indignities" that rendered the marriage "in-
tolerable. "37 For a short period in the 1870s and 
1880s the lenient divorce and residency laws in 
North and South Dakota made them havens for 
migratory divorces. The pattern, however, was 
much different in the southern Plains, where 
Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico made di-
vorce harder. 38 
There were also differences in the legal pro-
visions governing property rights of married 
women. While Texas and New Mexico adopted 
the civil law system of community property, the 
other Great Plains states embraced the common 
law system. Several of these states also wrote 
some degree of protection for married women's 
property rights into their constitutions, with 
Texas in 1845 and Kansas in 1859 leading the 
way. The expansion of land ownership by women 
gave these acts special significance, with Wy-
oming giving married women separate control 
over their earnings during marriage and equal 
custody of their children. 39 
Wyoming, of course, also led the way in 
granting women suffrage. In 1869 the territory 
granted women the right to vote, which also 
gave them access to the jury box and service in 
other positions formerly reserved for men. Es-
ther Morris, a Wyoming suffragist, served as the 
first female justice of the peace in the United 
States. Yet by 1900 only one other Great Plains 
state-Colorado-had followed Wyoming's 
lead. By 1914 Montana and Kansas had ex-
tended the franchise, but the other states in the 
region did not follow until shortly before passage 
of the nineteenth amendment in 1920.10 
These developments underscore the prob-
lems of thinking of the Great Plains as a legal 
unity. It is clear, of course, that a change in 
women's status was far more welcome there than 
in the East, but the motives were mixed at best. 
Where married women's property rights were 
involved, the pattern seems to have been more 
uniform, since giving women access to the eco, 
nomic mainstream was beneficial to economic 
growth. Why this was so in the Plains rather 
than the East is a question that, if answered, 
would tell us as much about developments there 
as on the Great Plains. 
In the case of suffrage the motives behind 
the legal and constitutional reforms were more 
varied. In the East, entrenched political struc' 
tures prevented broader social change; in lonely 
Wyoming there were no established political 
machines and accordingly there was no estab, 
lished opposition to the idea of women's suf, 
frage. 41 In Colomdo there is some evidence--
though far from conclusive--that its mdicalla, 
bor movement and strong populist roots led to 
acceptance of the related movement for female 
equality.42 In Kansas, women's rights were tied 
to women's religiosity and the hope that the 
women's vote would promote temperance and 
other moml causes. There were, once again, 
important intraregional and as well as interre, 
gional variations. 43 
EcoNOMICS AND LAW 
For all of its seeming democmtic and indi, 
vidualistic tendencies, the legal culture of the 
Great Plains reflects back to us strong tenden, 
des toward regulation of that most important 
of all areas of human endeavors--the creation 
of wealth. While seemingly professing the cow' 
boy ideal of "don't fence me in," Great Plains 
lawmakers were more than willing to regulate 
and redistribute wealth. 
While geogmphy and climate may well have 
shaped the agriculture pmcticed on the Plains, 
it was distant eastern and world markets that 
most influenced the wealth that residents of the 
Plains could generate from crops and livestock. 
Even so adamant an environmentalist as the 
sociologist Carl Kmenzel concluded that the 
Great Plains had been exploited by eastern 
LEGAL CULTURE 93 
manufacturers and milroads in such a way as to 
tum it into a kind of third,world economy that 
depended on agricultuml exports in order to 
attain eastern credit and technology.44 These 
developments, Kmenzel and others argue, ac, 
celerated in the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century and gave birth to first the Granger and 
then the Populist political movements. 
With the exception of a brief boom during 
the 1880s, the prices of agricultuml commodi, 
ties grown on the Plains plunged, with wheat, 
for example, falling by more than half its value, 
to $63 a bushel in 1897. Great Plains farmers 
attributed this collapse to the monopolistic 
practices of gmin elevator and railroad opem, 
tors, who in tum charged that the farmers had 
brought it on themselves by overproduction. 
Whatever the truth of the matter, the plains 
farmers concluded that they were badly abused, 
cheated by elevator owners, robbed by railroad 
barons, and overcharged by eastern manufac, 
turers. 45 Thus political action became the means 
to redress these woes, first in individual states, 
which passed antitrust and regulatory legislation 
involving railroads and elevators, and later in 
the movement for similar legislation in Wash, 
ington. The Granger movement of the 1870s 
was especially strong in Kansas and Nebraska 
where small town merchants and businessmen, 
who also suffered from predatory pricing poli, 
des, joined with farmers. Yet even on these 
important issues of economic regulation and re, 
distribution, the states of the Great Plains were 
not pioneers. The four upper Mississippi Valley 
states-Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minne, 
sota-were models of regulation, in large mea' 
sure because the Republican and Democmtic 
parties were evenly balanced there and hence 
vulnerable to political pressure from the 
Grange. 46 
Eventually, however, the political activism 
of these older states spilled over into the Plains. 
In the 1880s the boom in demand for plains 
foodstuffs brought an enormous infusion of spec' 
ulative capital. Land values skyrocketed; spec' 
ulation was rampant; every tiny hamlet began 
to think itself a metropolis. Fifteen Kansas towns 
installed streetcar systems during the boom, all 
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paid for by speculative eastern capital. Farmers 
committed the fatal sin of overmortgaging their 
property, and when the weather turned dry at 
the end of the 1880s the farm economies of the 
Plains collapsed. 47 
The depression of the late 1880s was so 
sweeping in its destruction that it forced many 
plains farmers, at least those who stayed, to 
rethink their relationship to the political and 
legal system. Between 1888 and 1892 half the 
population of western Kansas moved out, most 
of it back to the East. The farmers that remained 
were not only overmortgaged but they quickly 
fell into a vicious cycle of going deeper into 
debt each year in order to sell more goods at 
lower prices. This sweeping economic disaster 
brought new attention to the rights of debtors 
and the powers of creditors to seize and hold 
property in default, issues that deserve far closer 
attention among legal historians than they have 
received. This cumulative economic frustration 
eventually ignited the Populist Revolt. 
THE POPULIST REVOLT 
Populism on the Plains was not so much a 
political movement, although it was certainly 
that, as it was a quasi-religious revival, in which 
the farmers rallied to seek through law solutions 
to the crushing debt and the burdensome taxes 
that they faced. The agrarian revolt in 1890 
produced startling legal results on the Plains. 
The Populist revolt also ushered in the most 
important period of legal innovation on the 
Plains, and these developments came at a time 
when the Plains had, in tum, the greatest im-
pact on national law. While the Populist revolt 
spread far beyond the boundaries of the Great 
Plains, its farmers nonetheless symbolized its 
strength. At the 1892 convention of the Peo-
ple's Party in Omaha, Nebraska, the delegates 
agreed on what became for the next third of a 
century the major elements of reform politics 
in America: the creation of a flexible currency; 
honesty, economy, and greater openness in gov-
ernment; a graduated income tax; postal savings 
banks; government ownership of railroads and 
telegraph lines; abolition of alien land holdings; 
and reclamation of all lands held by railroads 
and other corporations in excess of their needs. 
The Populists insisted in the preamble to their 
1892 Omaha Platform that "wealth belongs to 
him who creates it. "48 
The Populist program looks mild by today's 
standards, but it was thoroughly radical in its 
own day. The legal and economic readjustments 
called for by the Populists had class conflict 
overtones, so much so that employers retaliated 
against many members by threatening them with 
wage cuts and layoffs if they voted for William 
Jennings Bryan in 1896. Bryan, of course, lost 
to the Republican William McKinley, although 
Bryan did carry all the Great Plains states except 
North Dakota. 
In defeat the Populists were ultimately vin-
dicated. They succeeded in securing from plains 
state legislatures debt relief legislation that be-
came a model for agricultural states outside the 
region. They wanted progressive constitutional 
and governmental reforms: the conservative 
Theodore Roosevelt gave them railroad regu-
lation, the reactionary William Howard Taft 
postal savings banks, and the liberal Woodrow 
Wilson a more flexible currency through the 
Federal Reserve System. The initiative and ref-
erendum the Populists desired, and the recall 
they considered too radical to ask for, were in 
general used not only in the Plains but through-
out the nation by 1912. The seventeenth 
amendment, allowing a federal income tax, came 
shortly afterward. 
THE FEDERAL IMPACT' 
These developments also help place the Plains 
within American federalism. The Populist Re-
volt sought through the power of the federal 
government to restore a semblance of balance 
between producers and consumers, one in which 
the exporting states of the Plains would have 
an opportunity to compete effectively in the 
national marketplace. Hence in the twentieth 
century the Great Plains states have been the 
beneficiaries of enormous government largess. 
In 1974 Governor Richard Lamm of Colorado 
echoed sentiments a century old when he en-
dorsed an OPEC-like organization of energy-
rich western states against proposed federal con-
trols. "We're saying," Lamm asserted, "that there 
are certain things that happen to colonies--
whether they are in Colorado or the Congo---
if there is not some assertiveness on the part of 
their leaders. And we are not going to be col-
onized."49 
Beneath such rhetoric lurks a profound real-
ity: On a per capita basis, no other region of 
the country in this century has been better sup-
ported by the federal government than the Great 
Plains, through massive agricultural subsidies, 
land and water reclamation projects, military 
bases, and most recently a futile effort to de-
velop coal gasification and synthetic fuels proj-
ects. Between 1850 and 1950, the federal 
government poured more than $150 billion into 
the region, and it has long since been the largest 
single employer in two of the plains states: North 
Dakota and New Mexico. 50 The distribution of 
this federal largess was neither simple nor au-
tomatic, depending as it has on a complicated 
network of federal, state, and local administra-
tive agencies staffed by thousands of bureau-
crats. The relationship between the federal 
administrative process and administrative law, 
on the one hand, and the economic develop-
ment of the Great Plains, on the other, is cer-
tainly one of the least understood aspects of the 
region's legal culture. Many of the plains states 
have resisted this federal involvement at the 
same time that they have benefited from it. 
Indeed, many residents of the Great Plains seem 
to love to hate the federal dollars that they love 
to receive. 
CoNCLUSION 
While the general drift in twentieth-century 
legal culture has been to secure individual rights 
through government-sponsored social welfare 
and economic opportunity programs, most of 
the region's states, especially in the upper Plains, 
have resisted. Moreover, for a region that prides 
itself on individualism and autonomy, its law-
makers have, like those in other sections of the 
nation, displayed a nasty tendency to strike out 
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against those that it fears. Thus, as Paul Pin-
kelman explains in his study of Meyer v. Ne-
braska, powerful nativist tendencies have 
frequently shaped the culture of rights on the 
Plains. 51 Surely legal historians can do much to 
understand the interplay of economic impera-
tive and racial and ethnic prejudice on the 
Plains. Much work remains to be done, as well, 
on what rights meant on the Great Plains in 
the context of white and Native American re-
lations, although we have made a beginning of 
sorts. 52 
At least on first impression, those qualities 
that seem to set the Great Plains apart-indi-
vidualism, innovation, democracy, and law-
lessness--appear on closer inspection to be more 
dimly reflected in the region's legal culture than 
Webb and other environmentalists believed. It 
may well be, as Patricia Nelson Limerick has 
argued, that as often as not these frontier qual-
ities dissolved into surface-skimming waste, 
brash overconfidence, and reckless specula-
tion. 53 She may well be right: the inhabitants 
of the Great Plains have been too absorbed in 
their own pursuit of wealth to pay much atten-
tion to the needs of society. The plains states 
have been, throughout their history, strong-
holds of political conservatism, despite outraged 
cries of easterners about plains radicalism. The 
periodic protests raised on the Plains have usu-
ally been leveled against change, with the re-
gion's residents preferring the maintenance of 
an agrarian social order against an increasingly 
industrialized and interdependent world econ-
omy. Ironically this seems to have been the 
motivation of farmers who in the 1930s shifted 
the center of conservative Republicanism to the 
upper Plains in their vain effort to check a "New 
Deal" that held forth the best promise for farm 
supports, relief to the victims of the dust bowl, 
and programs to address the cataclysmic effects 
of massive land erosion. More recently, the 
Plains have given support to Richard Nixon and 
Ronald Reagan, doing so in the apparent belief 
that private enterprise and individual effort alone 
would solve national problems. 
Taken together, these developments warn us 
about the elusive nature of our quest for the 
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legal culture of the Great Plains. It may exist, 
but more as a paradox than as a bundle of values 
and attitudes associated with a clear geograph-
ical area. Scholars disagree about whether there 
is--or was-a Great Plains and whether the 
widely accepted environmental definition of re-
gion gains coherence at the expense of distort-
ing the East-West cultural similarities that sing 
through the Plains. 
As is true with all regional approaches to 
legal culture, we must be careful not to confuse 
the description of an area with the motive forces 
that bring about legal change in the first place. 
Even if we find, in the end, a strong correlation 
among geography, climate, and law, we may 
not be much further along in understanding the 
region's legal culture, because to grasp the val-
ues and attitudes that shape law on the Great 
Plains or elsewhere we must necessarily look at 
those issues of law and society where they are 
most likely to appear-in the ways in which law 
mediates among competing modes of produc-
tion and in the role it has played in defining 
and sustaining gender, class, and race relations. 
My suspicion is that when we approach the issue 
of legal culture in this way we are likely to find 
that the Great Plains was far more like the rest 
of American legal culture than it was different 
from it. Differences between the Plains and other 
regions tended to be those of timing, pace, and 
manner, not differences in fundamental social 
attitudes. 
There is, of course, no such thing as the legal 
culture of the Great Plains, or of the South or 
the West for that matter. In an area as diverse 
as the Plains, there are all sorts of attitudes and 
opinions about law, and we should be prepared 
to understand them. But on a broad scale the 
standard shibboleths about individualism, in-
novation, democracy, and lawlessness seem 
overwrought. We may be skillfull and, yes, lucky, 
enough to be able to divine certain broad ten-
dencies, ones that would help, if identified, to 
shape our understanding of not just the law-
the statutes, the judicial pronouncements, the 
organizational schemes-but of the connection 
between it and social change. If we understand 
such connections, then we will certainly have 
a much better idea about whether what goes on 
through the legal process in this region can ac-
tually be analyzed as a coherent legal culture. 
These are of necessity only surface impres-
sions about the legal culture of the Great Plains. 
Perhaps there is more that is distinctive to it 
than seems to be the case. There may well be 
some yawning gulf that separates attitudes and 
values about the law in, say, South Dakota, 
from those in California or New Jersey. To find 
out we simply must learn more about law on 
the Great Plains. 
NOTES 
1. As quoted in David Hackett Fischer, "Models 
of Intellectual Change in the Antebellum South and 
North: A Comparative Perspective," paper presented 
at the Southern Intellectual History Circle Confer-
ence, Gainesville, Florida, 21 February 1991, p. 4. 
2. See Kermit L. Hall, Comprehensive Bibliography 
of American Constitutional and Legal History, 5 vols. 
(Millwood, New York: Kraus International Publica-
tions, 1984); and Hall, Comprehensive Bibliography of 
American Constitutional and Legal History Supplement 
1980-1987, 2 vols. (Millwood, New York: Kraus In-
ternational Publications, 1991). 
3. See, for example, Kermit L. Hall and James 
W. Ely, Jr., eds., Constitutionalism and the History of 
the South (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989) 
and David J. Bodenhamer and James W. Ely, Jr., 
Ambivalent Legacy: A Legal History of the South (Jack-
son: University Press of Mississippi, 1984). A good 
introduction to most of the recent writing on the 
legal history of the Rocky Mountain region and the 
Far West is Gordon Bakken, The Development of the 
Law on the Rocky Mountain Frontier: Civil Law and 
Society, 1850-1912 (Westport, Connecticut: Green-
wood Press, 1983); and Bakken, Rocky Mountain 
Constitution Making, 1850-1912 (Westport, Con-
necticut: Greenwood Press, 1987). Suggestive of some 
of the work on the Pacific states is Arthur F. McEvoy, 
The Fisherman's Problem: Ecology and Law in the Cal-
ifornia Fisheries 1850-1980 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1986). There are no comparable 
volumes for the Great Plains. 
4. Kermit L. Hall, "The Magic Mirror: American 
Constitutional and Legal History," The International 
Journal of Social Education 1 (Autumn 1986): 22-48; 
James Willard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth: The 
Legal History of the Lumber Industry in Wisconsin, 1836-
1915 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); 
Roscoe Pound, The Formative Era of American Law 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1938). 
5. The best example is Walter Prescott Webb, 
The Great Plains (New York; Grosset & Dunlap, 1931), 
pp. 385, 398-431, 496-502. More recent studies give 
only slight attention to legal and constitutional de-
velopments and most often they emphasize the law-
less nature of the region. See, for example, Ray Allen 
Billington and Martin Ridge, Westward Expansion: A 
History of the American Frontier, 5th ed. (New York; 
Macmillan, 1982); and Patricia Nelson Limerick, The 
Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American 
West (New York; Norton, 1987). 
6. Peter Harris, "Ecology and Culture in the Com-
munication of Precedent Among State Supreme 
Courts, 1870-1970," Law & Society Review 19 (1985); 
449-86; Lawrence M. Friedman, Robert Kagan, Bliss 
Cartwright, and Stanton Wheeler, "State Supreme 
Courts; A Century of Style and Citation," Stanford 
Law Review 33 (May 1981); 787; Rodney Mott, "Ju-
dicial Influence," American Political Science Review 30 
(March 1936); 295-322. 
7. Harris, "Communication of Precedent" (note 
6 above), pp. 476-77. 
8. Mott, "Judicial Influence" (note 6 above), pp. 
300-302. 
9. Harris, "Communication of Precedent" (note 
6 above), p. 470. 
10. Robert A. Kagan, Bobby D. Infelise, and 
Robert R. Detlefsen, "American State Supreme Court 
Justices, 1900-1970," American Bar Foundation Re-
search Journal (Spring 1984); 371-408. This conclu-
sion is supported, moreover, by studies such as John 
D. W. Guice, The Rocky Mountain Bench: The Ter-
ritorial Supreme Courts of Colorado, Montana, and Wy-
oming, 1861-1890 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1972); Michael W. Homer, "The Territorial Judi-
ciary; An Overview of the Nebraska Experience, 1854-
1867," Nebraska History 63 (Fall 1982); 349-90; and 
Robert A. Heiberg, "Social Backgrounds of the Min-
nesota Supreme Court Justices: 1858-1968," Min-
nesota Law Review 53 (1969); 901-37. The same 
pattern was observed in Washington Territory by John 
R. Wunder in Inferior Courts, Superior Justice: A His-
tory of the Justices of the Peace on the Northwest Frontier, 
1853-1889 (Westport, Connecticut; Greenwood 
Press, 1979). 
11. See, for example, the excellent articles edited 
by David Langum in the special issue of Journal of 
the West 24 (January 1985) devoted to legal history. 
12. James W. Ely, Jr., and David J. Bodenhamer, 
"Regionalism and American Legal History: The 
Southern Experience," Vanderbilt Law Review 39 
(April 1986): 540-48. 
13. Lawrence M. Friedman, Total Justice (New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1985), pp. 30-34. 
14. Newton Minnow, quoted in National Law 
Journal, 4 February 1985, p. 4. 
15. Roscoe Pound, Introduction to the Philosophy 
LEGAL CULTURE 97 
of Law, rev. ed. (New Haven; Yale University Press, 
1954), p. 10. 
16. Ely and Bodenhamer, "Regionalism and 
American Legal History" (note 12 above), pp. 539-
40. 
17. See, for example, Ely and Bodenhamer, "Re-
gionalism and American Legal History" (note 12 
above); Bakken, Rocky Mountain Constitution Making 
(note 3 above); Paul Finkelman, "Exploring South-
ern Legal History," North Carolina Law Review 64 
(November 1985); 77-116; John P. Reid, Law for the 
Elephant: Property and Social Behavior on the Overland 
Trail (San Marino: Huntington Library, 1980); and 
David J. Langum, Law and Community on the Mexican 
California Frontier: Anglo-American Expatriates and the 
Clash of Legal Traditions, 1821-1846 (Norman: Uni-
versity of Oklahoma Press, 1987). 
18. Webb, The Great Plains (note 5 above), p. 8. 
19. Ibid., p. 206. 
20. Ian Frazier, Great Plains (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1989). 
21. Terry L. Anderson and P. J. Hill, "The Evo-
lution of Property Rights; A Study of the American 
West, "Journal of Law and Economics 18 (April 1975); 
172-76; Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in 
American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989), p. 46; Reid, Law for the Elephant (note 17 
above), pp. 210-20. 
22. This argument is also treated in Kermit L. 
Hall, "The 'Magic Mirror' and the Promise of West-
ern Legal History at the Bicentennial of the Con-
stitution," Western Historical Quarterly 18 (October 
1987): 429-36 and Donald Worster, "New West, True 
West: Interpreting The Region's History," Western 
Historical Quarterly 18 (April 1987); 141-56. 
23. Anderson and Hill, "Evolution of Property 
Rights" (note 21 above), pp. 169-72. 
24. Frazier, Great Plains (note 20 above), pp. 121-
25. 
25. Anderson and Hill, "Evolution of Property 
Rights" (note 21 above), pp. 176-78. 
26. Donald J. Pisani, "Enterprise and Equity; A 
Critique of Western Water Law in the Nineteenth 
Century," Western Historical Quarterly 18 (January 
1987): 15-21. 
27. Robert G. Dunbar, Forging New Rights in West-
ern Waters (Lincoln; University of Nebraska Press, 
1983); Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal 140 (1855); Lux v. 
Haggin, 69 Cal 255 (1886); and Katz v. Walkinshaw, 
141 Cal 116 (1902). 
28. Robett G. Dunbar, "The Adaptability of Water 
Law to the Aridity of the West," Journal of the West 
24 (January 1985): 60-62. 
29. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of 
American Law 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1977), pp. 34-42. 
30. Webb, The Great Plains (note 5 above), pp. 
98 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SPRING 1992 
4%-502; Limerick, The Legacy of C01U]uest (note 5 
above), pp. 169-75; Truman Capote, In Cold Blood: 
A True Account of a Multiple Murder and Its Conse-
quences (New York: Random House, 1965). 
31. Raymond D. Gastil, Cultural Regions of the 
United States (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
1975), pp. 97-116. 
32. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert GUIT, 
Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Per-
spectives, vol. 2 (Washington, D. c.: Government 
Printing Office, 1969), pp. 392-93. 
33. Earl Pomeroy, "Toward a Reorientation of 
Western History: Continuity and Environment," 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41 (March 1955): 
581 and Robert Berkhofer, Jr., "Space, Time, Cul-
ture, and the New Frontier," Agricultural History 38 
(January 1964): 24-30. 
34. Frederick C. Luebke, "Introduction," in Brian 
W. Blouet and Frederick C. Luebke, eds., The Great 
Plains: Environment and Culture (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1979), pp. ix-xxv. 
35. Gastil, Cultural Regions (note 31 above), pp. 
108-37, 293. 
36. Paula Petrik, "Women and the Law on the 
Great Plains," paper presented at the Center for Great 
Plains Studies Symposium, "Law, the Bill of Rights, 
and the Great Plains, " Lincoln, Nebraska, 6-9 March 
1991, pp. 10, 7. 
37. Ibid. and Lawrence M. Friedman and Robert 
J. Percival, "Who Sues for Divorce? From Fault 
through Fiction to Freedom," Journal of Legal Studies 
5 (1976): 63-65. 
38. Robert L. Griswold, Family and Divorce in 
California, 1850-I 890: Victorian IUusions and Everyday 
Realities (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1980), p. 25. 
39. Mari J. Matsuda, "The West and the Legal 
Status of Women: Explanations of Frontier Femin-
ism," Journal of the West 24 (January 1985): 50, 51. 
40. Ibid., pp. 51-54. 
41. Ibid., p. 53. 
42. Billie Barnes Jensen, "Colorado Woman Suf-
frage Campaigns of the 1870s," Journal of the West 
12 (June 1978): 182-90. 
43. Eleanor Flexner, Century of Struggle: The 
Women's Rights Movement in the United States, 7th 
ed. (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1982), pp. 178-80. 
#. Carl F. Kraenzel, The Great Plains in Transition 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955), p. 
283. See also the discussion of Kraenzel's work in 
Luebke, "Inttoduction" (note 34 above), pp. xiv-
xvi. 
45. Berkhofer, "Space, Time, Culture" (note 33 
above), p. 24. 
46. Billington and Ridge, Westward Expansion 
(note 5 above), pp. 669, 680-81. 
47. Ibid., p. 67l. 
48. Ibid., p. 677. 
49. Quoted in Harry N. Scheiber, "Xenophobia 
and Parochialism in the History of American Legal 
Process: From the Jacksonian Era to the Sagebrush 
Rebellion," William & Mary Law Review 23 (Summer 
1982): 660. 
50. Gerald D. Nash, "Bureaucracy and Reform 
in the West: Notes on the Influence of a Neglected 
Interest Group," Western Historical Quarterly 2 (July 
1971): 295-305. 
51. Paul L. Finkelman, "German Victims and 
American Oppressors: The Background and Legacy 
of Meyer v. Nebraska," paper presented at the Center 
for Great Plains Studies Symposium, Lincoln, Ne-
braska, March 1991, p. 10. 
52. See, for example, John R. Wunder, Retained 
by the People: A History of American Indians and the 
Bill of Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming 1992). 
53. Limerick, Legacy of C01U]Ufst (note 5 above), 
pp. 17-32. 
